Down in the sixth perek of Avot, the place where mishnayot give way to baraitot and the normal order of things seems, well, a little different, there’s an anonymous baraita that begs to be discussed:
כַּךְ הִיא
דַּרְכָּהּ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה: פַּת בְּמֶֽלַח תֹּאכֵל, וּמַֽיִם בִּמְשׂוּרָה
תִּשְׁתֶּה, וְעַל הָאָֽרֶץ תִּישָׁן, וְחַיֵּי צַֽעַר תִּחְיֶה, וּבַתּוֹרָה
אַתָּה עָמֵל, אִם אַתָּה עֽוֹשֶׂה כֵּן, אַשְׁרֶֽיךָ וְטוֹב לָךְ, אַשְׁרֶֽיךָ
בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה, וְטוֹב לָךְ לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא
Thus is the way of Torah: Bread with salt you shall eat, water in small
measure you shall drink, and upon the ground you shall sleep; live a life of
deprivation and toil in Torah. If so you do, "fortunate are you, and it’s
good for you" (Psalms 128:2): you are fortunate in this world, and it is
good for you in the World to Come.
Maharam Shik is troubled by a question. This baraita prescribes a thoroughly Torah-orientated and ascetic life as the means of qualifying to be fortunate in this world and deriving some form of good—whatever form that might take—in the World to Come. Eating bread with salt, drinking water in moderation, sleeping on the ground and living a life of physical hardship are all criteria that can be ascertained through checking objectively identifiable markers. We know if we have eaten bread or cake, and so do others around us. We know if we are drinking water in moderation or beer in excess, and so on. But toiling in Torah is quite another matter. We may be sincerely putting in a high level of effort, or we may be going through the motions—and sometimes we can’t even be sure for ourselves of what our motives are. Are we really learning lishmah, for the sake of Torah itself, or for some laudable or dubious ulterior motive? And does it matter?
In his understanding of
this baraita, Maharam Shik acknowledges that there is all the difference in the
world between learning for the sake of Torah and learning for other reasons.
One might be trying to impress one’s friends and family or to achieve high
status in the eyes of one’s community. Alternatively, one’s learning might be
motivated by curiosity, by one’s interest in linguistic phenomena found in
ancient languages, or by the thrill of the intellectual chase—the sort of buzz
that might be generated by solving a tough chess problem or completing a killer
sudoku. Though we do recognize that there is some value in learning even if it
is not lishmah, that value is specifically directed towards its
propensity to lead the learner to the preferred and approved mind-frame of one
who learns lishmah.
So what of our ascetic
who adheres relentlessly to his life of personal discipline and hardship? Is he
wasting his time? Not at all. Such a
person, Maharam Shik explains, is practising the art of self-control—and this
is precisely the quality demanded of anyone who is to rein in his yetzer
hara, his drive to give in and yield to his baser instincts. The man who
submits to the hardships listed in our baraita—even if he is only studying Torah
to amuse himself—is the sort of man who can be trusted not to eat that second
piece of chocolate gateau when there’s no-one watching him. Here is a man who
at least merits the rewards that come from practising the technique for conquering
the will to do wrong.
Our problem of the person
who learns lo lishmah has an interesting twist to it when we consider the
concept of the Issachar-Zevulun partnership. There, one party (the ‘Zevulun’) sacrifices
his learning opportunities in order go out and ply a trade or profession in
order to support the other party (the ‘Issachar’) in learning. Issachar reaps
the benefit of Zevulun’s material support, in return for which Zevulun receives
a share of the reward or benefit derived from Issachar’s learning. If Issachar
is learning lo lishmah, for his own amusement or curiosity, is Zevulun
automatically deprived of any benefit in recompense for his personal spiritual
sacrifice? This question was raised, I think, by the Sefat Emet, but I am not
aware of any answer. However, if we maintain that the development of one’s
self-discipline to the point that one can resist the yetzer hara, and
this in itself is a meritorious act, one can at least argue that there is some
form of zechut from which Zevulun is entitled to benefit too.
Another question we can
ask is this: does our mishnah concern Jews only, or does a reward for
conquering one’s baser instincts apply to non-Jews too? We must conclude that
it does. Earlier in Avot, at 4:1, the Tanna Ben Zoma asks four questions: who
is wise, who is strong, who is fortunate and who receives honour. To each of
these questions he supplies an answer. A person is wise who learns from
everyone; he is strong if he conquers his yetzer (the subject of our
baraita at 6:4); he is fortunate if he is happy with his lot and he receives
honour when he gives honour to others. This
mishnah is notably universalist: there is nothing to tie the answers to these
four questions to issues such as Jewish status, religious practice or even
belief in God.
My final thought on this
topic is that the content of Pirkei Avot is mainly directed to how we should
behave towards others, and much of it is addressed specifically to the
practising Jew. But, while mitzvot govern the life of the Jew, manners are at
the heart of all civilized human activity. Significantly, while we are expected
to learn Torah and perform mitzvot lishmah, there is nothing to say that
our middot, the way we behave towards others, must be lishmah too. And
if the guidance of a mishnah or baraita is clearly applicable to Jew and non-Jew
alike, I think that it is particularly important for us Jews to make sure we
follow it.
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