Breakfast with Bachye, or When a Leader Leads Others Astray

The other morning, while enjoying my breakfast coffee, toast and marmalade, I was perusing Rabbenu Bachye ibn Paquda’s Chovot Halevavot (Sha’ar Hateshuvah, perek 9). There I found a paragraph that caught my eye. Answering the question whether repentance is available for every type of sin, Rabbenu Bachye writes:

ממה שתקשה התשובה ממנו, מי שהדיח בני אדם בדת שבדה להם, והכריחם להאמין בה, ותעה והתעה. וכל אשר יוסיף העם המאמינים בה, יוסיף עוונו ויוכפל

כמו שאמרו רבותינו זיכרונם לברכה

כל המזכה את הרבים, אין חטא בא על ידו

וכל המחטיא את הרבים, אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה

ואמרו: ירבעם חטא והחטיא את הרבים, חטא הרבים תלוי בו

שנאמר (מלכים א טו) על חטאת ירבעם אשר חטא ואשר החטיא וגו

[In English: And repentance is even harder for a person who led others astray by inventing a religion for them and making it necessary for them to believe in it. That person went astray and made others go astray too—and, the more people believe in it, the increasingly serious is that person’s iniquity. As our rabbis of blessed memory said: “One who causes the community to be meritorious, no sin will come by his hand, but whoever causes the community to sin is not given the opportunity to repent. Moses was meritorious and caused the community to be meritorious, so the community's merit is attributed to him; as it says, "He did God's righteousness, and His laws with Israel" (Deuteronomy 33:21). Jeroboam the son of Nebat sinned and caused the community to sin, so the community's sin is attributed to him; as it says, "Regarding the sins of Jeroboam, who sinned and caused Israel to sin" (I Kings 15:30)”].

The citation from the rabbis of blessed memory will be instantly recognised by many Pirkei Avot enthusiasts as the anonymous mishnah from Avot (at 5:21).

Rabbenu Bachye’s citation of this mishnah is in accord with his regular practice of bringing source materials to support his statements, and he often cites Avot. But what is interesting here is the fact that the cited mishnah itself cites sources.

The first citation is at first glance a strange one, since the words of the Torah do not refer to Moses at all. They are actually spoken by him and refer to the tribe of Gad, which Moses is in the process of blessing. It is only through midrash that they are linked to Moses himself. But let’s pass over that citation and move to the second one.

The reference to Jeroboam sinning and causing others to do is entirely appropriate here. Jeroboam’s sins are well recorded in Tanach, even though there is no explicit account of him being unable to effect repentance on the ground that he made others sin too. But what is of interest is the use to which Rabbenu Bachye puts this verse when applying the mishnah.

The mishnah at Avot 5:21 does not refer to any particular sin and, on the face of things, can apply to them all. This position seems to be assumed by most commentators. However, by applying the mishnah specifically to the situation in which a person invents a new religion, a situation analogous to avodah zarah (idol worship), Rabbenu Bachye is effectively contextualising it through the Jeroboam quote. We know that Jeroboam instituted idol worship by setting up no fewer than three golden calves (1 Kings 12:28-33). This offence is the counterpart of Moses’ righteousness (alluded to in the first verse cited), since he descended from Mount Sinai and destroyed the original golden calf. This interpretation of the mishnah as applying specifically to idol worship thus justifies the pairing of the two supporting citations.

Rabbenu Bachye however appears to be unusual among Jewish scholars in giving this mishnah so narrow a construction. Rabbenu Yonah, Rambam, Bertenura, the commentary ascribed to Rashi and Midrash Shmuel are among those who vest it with a wide meaning, imposing no limitation in terms of the sort of sin that a leader might be inducing the general public to follow and modern commentators—if they have anything to say on the subject at all—tend to do likewise, concentrating on issues such as the extent to which a person is responsible for another’s good or bad deeds.

Admittedly, Rabbenu Bachye’s objective is not to provide a commentary on Avot but to provide an in-depth focus on the significance and consequence of a person’s thoughts. Even so, his approach raises a bigger interpretational question relating to how we should handle Avot’s proof-verses.

Verses from Tanach cited in some mishnayot and baraitot are plainly relevant on the face of things. Others are of little obvious relevance and others again are clearly cited out of context. Yet the very fact that they have been incorporated into the teachings of Tannaim means that they cannot be ignored and, if no obvious reason should be found for citing them, it is incumbent on us to look more deeply into them. We also have to accept that, while the same verse may appear in Tanach and in Avot, commentators on Tanach rarely if ever make any reference to the use of that verse in Avot, and commentators on Avot appear most reluctant to take note of explanations of those verses in their original context as part of the written Torah.

Ultimately, what one does with proof verses cited in Avot reflects one’s view of their function. Some scholars start with the mishnayot and seek to work back into their historical or religious context. Others head in precisely the opposite direction, projecting possible meanings and interpretations into social and political circumstances that would have been quite unfamiliar to their authors. No single approach is “correct” or “incorrect” and all ways of reading a Mishnah can enrich our appreciation of them and help us reach a higher understanding.