Friday, 9 September 2022

Are you a man or a chameleon?

The other day I came across a paragraph that stopped me dead in my tracks. It read as follows:

“In order for a person to have a meaningful, constructive identity, it should be one which he gives to himself. If a person has no other identity than that given to him by others, he really has no identity at all. He must change like a chameleon, being one thing to his wife, another to his parents, another to his children, another to his employer, another to this friend, and yet another to a different friend”.

What was it about this paragraph that so gripped my attention? First, it struck me as being so completely wrong that it could not withstand any serious analysis. Secondly, it was written by Rabbi Abraham J. Twerski and appears in his commentary on Pirkei Avot, Visions of the Fathers, a work that I enjoy reading and from which I have learned a great deal.

Why do I find Rabbi Twerski’s words here so unacceptable? Perhaps it is because I am a chameleon at heart. I believe strongly that one has to be different things to different people and that this does indeed shape one’s identity. Let us start with our parents—the first and most influential relationships in most people’s lives—and then go on to our teachers, friends, colleagues, partners and children. Anyone who lives in a society that is comprised of other people will immediately recognise that they are bound to be shaped by them. It is simply impossible to be the same person to each of them in every situation and live a fulfilled and meaningful existence, as the Torah’s narrative of Moses’ personal relationships seems to suggest.

Pirkei Avot itself seems to require us to be different people in different circumstances. Thus Rabbi Yishmael (Avot 3:16) encourages us to play different roles depending on whether we are dealing with our superiors or those junior to us. The principle of al tifrosh min hatzibur (“don’t separate yourself from the community”: Avot 2:5, 4:7) reflects the notion that we should commit ourselves to a shared position rather than stand out alone). Also, we are supposed to make ourselves loved (Avot 6:1, 6:6), which is certainly easier when one adjusts to the circumstances of each relationship in our lives rather than stick to our chosen identity and wait for others to adjust to us.

Moving from morality to metaphor, is it even such a bad thing to be a chameleon? While these creatures change colour to match their immediate environment, they do so for the sake of their safety and survival. This is the same survival technique that many of our fellow Jews employ when mixing outside their comfort zone: hats are exchanged for caps; tzitzit are tucked in, and so on. But in the real world, despite their camouflage, chameleons still recognise one another—just as Jews tend to do in business centres, airport terminals and shopping malls around the world.

Ultimately, since I have no wish to quarrel with the words of Rabbi Twerski, I shall endeavour to read them as applying to the starting point in a person’s life, before the question of familial and social interaction becomes a problem. We should all have a default position, something that defines our essential individuality, before we find ourselves engaged in the lifelong task of compromising it when we encounter other people. After all, an identity remains an identity even when it is compromised. 

Monday, 5 September 2022

Left dangling: limits to free will revisited

In an earlier post (Freedom of choice and lined writing paper) I opened a discussion on Rabbi Akiva’s apothegm that “everything is foreseen, but free will is given” (Avot 3:19). My point was that, while this teaching is usually taken to allude to God’s foresight and supervision of the world, it can also be understood to refer to the way our freedom to exercise our choice is limited by human considerations as well as by divine ones. This line of thought would not be inappropriate, given the era in which Rabbi Akiva lived and the cause of his death.

It is often assumed that the free will versus determinism debate hinges on whether a man is a puppet who, dangling from the puppeteer’s string, has no real choice in what he does. Those who take this extreme view often press the point that God controls absolutely everything: if a person exercises choice in performing any act, it is only because the circumstances leading to that choice and the means of resolving it are both predetermined by God. Free choice is therefore an illusion. We are however bound to believe that we exercise free will, since it is this that gives any sort of personal meaning to our lives.

Others take the view that God’s control over human thoughts and actions is more nuanced in that, while setting the parameters within which we act out our daily existence, He has the freedom to choose the extent to which we exercise a genuine freedom of choice.

I can give an example, by way of analogy. Many years ago, two of my grandsons were fighting one another. Initially a play fight, the game became a little too rough and I decided to intervene. I lifted the lighter boy off the ground and held him firmly so that he could neither kick nor punch his cousin, though he made strenuous attempts to do so.

At one level my intervention curtailed the physical motion of the wriggling child. He could neither escape my grasp nor approach his foe. This was clearly a constraint upon his freedom to choose where to move. On another level, however, I contemplated the full range of options that remained available to him:

  • Continue to resist my grip (in which case I would simply strengthen it as necessary);

  • Stop squirming and relax (in which case I would have put him down, at a safe distance from his protagonist);

  • Say he was sorry (in which case I would have put him down near his erstwhile rival, having first extracted an undertaking from the latter that hostilities would cease);

  • Scream (in which case I would have ignored him till he stopped screaming);

  • Call for his mother to intervene (which is what he actually did).

I like to think that this scenario reflected in human terms the sort of thing that Rabbi Akiva had in mind in this mishnah. Do you agree?

Sunday, 4 September 2022

Orphaned, unloved

I’m sad to say that I’ve just picked up another abandoned commentary on Pirkei Avot from the streets of Jerusalem. This time it’s Melitz Yosher al Pirkei Avot, by Rabbi Reuven Melamed, rosh mesivta at Ponevezh Yeshivah and a talmid muvchak of the celebrated mashgiach of Ponevezh, Rabbi Yechezkel Levenstein ztz”l.

Self-published in Bnei Brak 1990, this book is in mint condition and shows signs of never having been opened. It is handsomely produced, with clear, vowelised Hebrew for the mishnayot and baraitot and well-spaced, unpointed text for the commentary itself.

I look forward to dipping into this little book and reporting on some of its more interesting content. Meanwhile, does any reader know anything of this book and its author?

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Postscript

On the same topic, readers may remember that not long ago I found another unwanted edition of Avot that contained two commentaries—the Tiferet Tzion of Rabbi Yitzchak Ze’ev Yadler and the Kerem Chemed of his grandson Rabbi Yehudah Rabinowitz (see earlier post on Facebook and on the Avot Today blog)—which I picked up from a street sale for the princely sum of 10 shekel. I’ve been sampling the Tiferet Tzion daily over my breakfast and can testify to it being a gentle, traditional commentary that takes pleasure in delving into the Gemara in order to highlight or illustrate the teachings in Avot. Even though I’ve not yet finished the first perek, I’m delighted to say that I’ve got far more than 10 shekels-worth of value for my purchase.

Friday, 2 September 2022

Seniors and juniors

Still on the subject of teaching and learning, Ben Zoma famously asks (Avot 4:1) “Who is wise?”, then answers his own question: “The person who learns from everyone”. Some commentators take this literally, while others limit its scope of application. However, the principle is clear: we should keep an open mind that enables us to learn from every situation in which we find ourselves and should certainly not exclude the possibility that someone who is junior to us in terms of age, experience or knowledge might nonetheless be able to enrich our understanding.

For many years I acted as a consultant to a major London-based law firm.  My role was to provide a level of academic or theoretical understanding of my subject to supplement the highly practice-based expertise of my practising colleagues. During the course of my time there, I had a long conversation with one, a relatively senior lawyer with aspirations to become a partner. This lawyer was a bit of an enthusiast and enjoyed discussing developments in the law for its own sake and not necessarily because those developments affected any of the firm’s clients.

One might have assumed that the best people to go to, when asking deep and meaningful questions about the law, were the partners. They, after all, were the lawyers at the top of the tree and had got there by demonstrating their legal expertise. But this was not usually the case. While the partners were unquestionably the most skilled and seasoned lawyers in the department, they often had relatively little to say about recent developments and theoretical perspectives in their field. Why was this? Because they had usually studied the law quite a long time earlier and had found little time to keep up with subsequent changes in the law. Many followed developments only on a need-to-know basis. The most junior lawyers, in contrast, having most recently studied the law, were closer to it and a good deal more up-to-date. So, paradoxically, the lawyers with the greatest knowledge of the current law were generally those at the bottom of the tree, not their elders and betters. There should therefore be no shame or embarrassment in a senior lawyer seeking advice or information from a fresh-faced trainee.

Incidentally, it has been my experience that, in many law firms, trainee lawyers do not receive the respect they deserve. This is certainly contrary to the principle laid down by Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua (Avot 4:15) that a person should let the honour of his student be as dear to him as his own. Every senior lawyer was a junior lawyer once, and that alone should remind them what it feels like to be an apprentice who lives at the mercy of his master.

Thursday, 1 September 2022

Avot in retrospect: a summary of last month's blogposts

In case you missed them, here's a list of items posted on Avot Today in AUGUST 2022:

Tuesday 30 August 2022: Watch what you say -- and what you do: a new slant on Avtalyon: It's not just a teacher's words that can mislead pupils, as the Tiferet Tzion explains.

Sunday 28 August 2022: Teachers and students: As the new academic year approaches, it's time to review the teaching relationship and the need for integrity and trust.

Friday 26 August 2022: Well-worn mishnah, well-worded explanation. Tiferet Tzion offers a neat and practical way to look at Yehoshua ben Perachya's classic teaching.

Tuesday 23 August 2022: Ethics without Avot? A reading of the 1972 essay collection Modern Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice raises questions as to the relevance of the Ethics of the Fathers to ethics of any description.

Sunday 21 August 2022: Freedom of choice and lined writing paper: There is more than one way of viewing the famous free will v determinism conundrum of Rabbi Akiva.

Thursday 18 August 2022: Does God accept bribes? Both the written Torah and its oral counterpart assert that God has no favourites and takes no bribes -- but that has not stopped humans seeking to gain influence with Him.

Wednesday 17 August 2022: Abarbanel in brief. We welcome a precis of the Abarbanel's mammoth commentary on Avot.

Monday 15 August 2022: Hedgehogs, foxes and the "one great thing": Sir Isaiah Berlin's classic essay sparks off some thoughts on what it takes to be a practising Jew, contrasting the position of the written Torah with that of Avot.

Friday 12 August 2022: Harry Potter and the Tractate of TruthIs it appropriate to write an explanation of the teachings in Avot in light of the Harry Potter books, or is it disrespectful or downright harmful?

Thursday 11 August 2022: Kids' Stuff: We take note of a recent children's book that is designed as an entertaining introduction to Avot.

Monday 8 August 2022: Slipping into holiday mode: what would Shammai say? "Making one's Torah fixed" is not just a lesson for people learning Torah -- it applies to us when we go away on vacation too.

Friday 5 August 2022: Comforting us on Tisha be'Av: an application of Avot: On this saddest of days in the Jewish calendar, we recite the consolatory prayer of Nachem only in the afternoon prayers. A reading of Avot discloses why this may be so.

Wednesday 3 August 2022: Preparing to say goodbyeA recent program on planning for death opens a discussion here about how far Pirkei Avot addresses that delicate issue.

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Avot Today blogposts for July 2022 
Avot Today blogposts for June 2022 

Avot Today blogposts for May 2022
Avot Today blogposts for April 2022
Avot Today blogposts for March 2022
Avot Today blogposts for February 2022

Tuesday, 30 August 2022

Watch what you say -- and what you do: a new slant on Avtalyon

With the new academic year in mind, it’s a good time to give some attention to teachers, students and the nature of their relationship. This is the second in a series of posts that reflect on the teachings in Avot on this topic.

The first chapter in Avot contains one mishnah that isn’t a bon mot or neat maxim, but really a narrative. It’s also unusual because it’s not being addressed to the public at large: it’s literally a “word to the wise”. I’m referring to the teaching at Avot 1:11 that runs like this:

Avtalyon used to say: “Wise men! Be careful with your words, in case you are exiled to a place where the water is bad. The disciples who follow after you will then drink this bad water and die, and the Name of Heaven will be desecrated.

This is one of a number of mishnayot in Avot that receives relatively little treatment from the commentators—not because it is undeserving of comment and discussion but because the parable is so clear in its meaning. Teach the Torah in a way that is wrong, and your students and followers will perpetuate your error. Fulfilment of the precepts of the Torah as a recipe for a Jew’s eternal life in the world to come; non-fulfilment is no guarantee of eternity.

The text of this Mishnah leaves it open to a wider interpretation. The parable opens with the Hebrew words

חֲכָמִים, הִזָּהֲרוּ בְדִבְרֵיכֶם, שֶׁמָּא תָחֽוֹבוּ חוֹבַת גָּלוּת

The Hebrew word rendered and generally understood as “your words” is דִבְרֵיכֶם. This same word, as Rabbi Yitzchak Ze’ev Yadler points out in his Tiferet Tzion, can also be taken to mean “things”—a general term that includes not just a person’s words but also one’s deeds, possessions, appearance and demeanour. Since humans learn from another not solely through verbal transmission but by emulating the conduct of others, a wise teacher should be aware of the extent to which not just classes and course materials but also personal habits, mannerisms, pet phrases and out-of-class conduct can impress themselves on disciples, talmidim and pupils of every kind.

Sunday, 28 August 2022

Teachers and students

With a new academic year shortly to commence in many countries, this is a good time to turn our thoughts to education. Of the 128 teachings in Pirkei Avot, a staggering proportion deal with this topic, a total of 58—that’s around 45 mishnayot and baraitot—give advice on teaching, studying or on the relationship between teacher and taught.

At its highest level, teaching can generate great personal tensions. This is not a solely Jewish phenomenon; it can be seen in kolel, in yeshivah and at university. This is because teachers who do their jobs well enough will often find that they have equipped their students to discuss their topic of study as equals; they may have empowered their students to take them on in argument, sometimes getting the better of them.

Pirkei Avot recognises (at 6:6) that teachers can learn from their students and also that a teacher is obliged to concede the truth when he knows he is wrong (5:9).  One should hold one’s students in as high a level of respect as one expects to receive oneself (4:15). There is no escape from the vital act of enriching another’s understanding: everyone, including a teacher, is supposed to have a teacher—and someone who can teach but doesn’t is regarded as being below contempt (1:13).

Having been a teacher and a student (often at the same time), I have often pondered on the complexities of the teacher-student relationship. Here’s a case in point.

Back in the 1980s I was teaching part of a postgraduate diploma course on intellectual property law. In the course of doing so, I often set written work. On one occasion I set an essay on patent law. One student, a lawyer from Pakistan, handed in a fairly mediocre effort, which I was obliged to read. The essay was quite week, apart from one perceptive and well-drafted paragraph in the middle which most impressed me. One reading it a second and then a third time, it gradually dawned on me that I had read it before. More than that, I had written it, this paragraph having been copied verbatim from my book, Introduction to Intellectual Property Law, that I had published a year or so before.

I called the student in to discuss the essay. I had no wish to hurt his feelings by labelling him a plagiarist or by challenging his honesty, but neither did I wish him to make a habit of doing such things since it was bound to get him into trouble eventually. Anyway, not wishing to embarrass him, I explained gently to him that in good legal circles it was considered wrong to pass the writings of another off as being one’s own, particularly without attributing that text to the author (see Avot 6:6). “I’m afraid you don’t understand”, I added, “but when I am marking an essay I want to know what you think so that I can see if you are right or wrong”.

The student looked a little surprised, then answered: “No, I’m afraid you don’t understand. I copied this paragraph to find out what you think, to see if you still agree with what you said when you wrote your book”.

How does this little scenario pan out in terms of Pirkei Avot? Suggestions, anyone?

Friday, 26 August 2022

Well-worn mishnah, well-worded explanation

Last week I had some kind words for the Tiferet Tzion, a gentle and user-friendly but sadly forgotten commentary on Avot by Rabbi Yitzchak Ze’ev Yadler. But praise is of no value unless there is some evidence that it is deserved. I shall now make up that omission by relating Rabbi Yadler’s short explanation of one of the best-known teachings in Avot.

In the first perek, Yehoshua ben Perachya teaches:

עֲשֵׂה לְךָ רַב, וּקְנֵה לְךָ חָבֵר, וֶהֱוֵי דָן אֶת כָּל הָאָדָם לְכַף זְכוּת

“Make for yourself a teacher, acquire for yourself a friend, and judge every man meritoriously”. (Avot 1:6).

Most commentators explain this Mishnah in a similar fashion. They discuss the importance of having a teacher and the steps one should take to procure one, as well as reviewing the course of action to pursue if one knows more than any available teacher or where one has two or more teachers. As for the acquisition of a friend, this has repercussions both for learning Torah—where a chavruta (learning partner) can be a valuable foil—and for serving as a sounding-board against which to bounce one’s ideas, ambitions and worries. Judging others meritoriously affects not only one’s relationship with other humans but also the quality of our own characters when we stand before God: we cannot expect God to be lenient in judging us if we have not taken the same line when judging our fellows.

 The Tiferet Tzion treats this mishnah quite differently, as a way of relating to other people. Essentially, there are three classes of people in everyone’s life: those who are ahead of us in knowledge and experience, those who are our peers and those over whom we have the edge—maybe because we are older, cleverer or just happen to know more. Yehoshua ben Perachya’s teaching focuses on this tripartite scheme.

For those who are ahead of us, we can make them our teachers since we are sure to be able to learn something from them. As for those who are our peers and equals, we should embrace them in friendship: we do not know-tow obsequiously to them, but neither do we strive to laud it over them. Then there are those who are less fortunate than ourselves when it comes to knowledge or intellectual capacity. We should not scorn or disrespect them but judge them favourably, bearing in mind the educational opportunities or natural abilities that they may not have possessed.

Rabbi Yadler does not claim this explanation as a chiddush, a work of his own intellectual creation, and it may well be that others have learned this mishnah the same way. All I can say is that I had not seen it before and thought that it was expressed in an economical, understated way that did not obscure the words of the Tanna.

Tuesday, 23 August 2022

Ethics without Avot?

I've recently been reading Modern Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice (1972)-- a collection of essays edited by Marvin Fox and originally delivered at meetings of the Institute for Judaism and Contemporary Thought, this being an initiative from a group of professors at Bar-Ilan University. 

What is this book about? According to the Preface:

"The purpose of the institute is to explore in depth the ways in which classical Judaism and contemporary thought may illuminate and fructify each other". 

So who is doing the illuminating and fructifying?

"The participants ... represent a wide variety of Jewish positions and life-styles, ranging from orthodoxy to secularism and from total religious observance to very little or none at all".

What is the common ground on which this meeting of minds takes place?

"... the strong conviction  that Judaism is an intellectually alive and significant option for contemporary men, and the equally strong conviction that a living Judaism must be in touch with and responsible to the best in contemporary thought".

The roll-call of contributors is impressive. Apart from Marvin Fox, an eminent Maimonidean scholar, many readers will instantly recognise the names of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein and Nachum Rabinovitch. The others boast between them a wide and impressive spread of academic and other credentials. 

I must confess that, in my ignorance, I was attracted to this book by the assumption that any book on Jewish ethics was bound to contain some meaningful discussion of the contents of Avot, a tractate of the Mishnah that has been generally regarded by Jewish sages for the past two millennia as having had something to do with ethics. This book, which covers some 250 pages of fascinating discussion, contains only two small references to Avot, thrown in en passant. And it's not as if there was no place for Avot either. For example, Emmanuel Levinas' florid and at times almost unreadable piece on "Ideology and Idealism" gives ample space to 'The Other' and to 'The Other as the Other Man', but the notion of man's relationship to himself and to real or constructed others -- a major theme in Avot -- gets no mention at all. 

To be fair, part of the book addresses moral issues that do not fall comfortably within the scope of Avot. There is a fascinating discussion of the ethics of war and the conduct of the Israel Defence Force to which its mishnayot are not of obvious application.
One is nevertheless led to ask an important question: does Avot -- taken together with the written Torah -- provide any sort of content or structure for the building of a Jewish ethical system, or is it simply a slightly more than averagely meaning book of etiquette for the Jews who lived 2,000 years ago?

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Postscript: does anyone know whatever happened to the Institute for Judaism and Contemporary Thought? It doesn't appear to be extant under that name today.


Sunday, 21 August 2022

Freedom of choice and lined writing paper

One of the most discussed statements in Avot is Rabbi Akiva’s apothegm (Avot 3:19):

הַכֹּל צָפוּי, וְהָרְשׁוּת נְתוּנָה

In English: “Everything is foreseen, but free will is given”.

Some commentators take it to refer to the apparent contradiction between God’s control of everything that happens in the world He created and the exercise by every human being of a free, uncontrolled and unfettered discretion to make their own decisions in life.  Others take it less seriously: Maharam Shik speculates that it is just a device to attract the attention of talmidim at the beginning of a shiur. All sorts of philosophical issues demand our attention. For example, is God’s foresight of what will happen tantamount to His control of it, or are there outcomes that He can foresee without the need for any intervention or control on His part? And is freedom of choice no more than an illusion, given that everything in the physical world can be traced back to an event that generates or determines it? And is Rabbi Akiva really telling us that, in order to accept both the omniscience and omnipotence of God and His role in guiding and subsequently evaluating our behaviour, we have to accept both propositions as true even though, at our level of understanding, it is impossible to reconcile the truth of them both?

There are other ways of looking at this teaching that do not depend on our view of an all-controlling God. For example, “everything is foreseen” can be taken as a nod to collective human conduct. A clue to the basis for this approach comes from the word “foresee” itself: the verb is formed from two elements: “fore”, meaning “in advance” or “ahead”, and “see”.  English has another word that splits the same way, one that comes from the Latin, and that is the verb “provide”.

We make advance provision for human conduct in so many aspects of communal life. Thus, in every civilised country, traffic proceeds on the same side of the road. It doesn’t matter if that side is the left or the right, so long as everyone does the same thing. No driver or pedestrian is deprived of the choice of which side of the road to occupy and, while laws may criminalise travel on the wrong side of the road, there is no physical or metaphysical barrier to the exercise of personal choice. In 2020 no fewer than 6% of road accidents in India resulted from traffic travelling on the wrong side of the road; the same practice causes an average of 355 deaths annually in the United States.

Life in human society furnishes countless further examples of provision that is made for others, not just through laws but also through customary behaviour, but which is somehow trumped by individual choice. Any parent who has thoughtfully laid out cutlery for a child who snubs the knife and fork provided in favour of fingers will know what this means. The desire to rebel against the foresight of others exists in Torah scholars too. In Visions of the Fathers (at Avot 1:6), Rabbi Abraham J. Twerski tells a story of Rabbi Shimon Shkop. The renowned Rosh Yeshiva once requested a sheet of writing paper so that he could write a letter. When handed a piece of lined paper, he is said to have quipped: “Why must I allow someone else to dictate where I should do my writing?”* The point is well made. Every part of a blank piece of paper can be written on, but the mere existence of lines will limit most people’s choice of where to place their pen.

So, literally speaking, Rabbi Akiva’s problematic mishnah can be stripped of its apparent conundrum and made to apply in even the most prosaic of circumstances. If we accept this view, we can contextualise it within Rabbi Akiva’s own life under the Roman occupation: even though the Romans provided for the banning of Jewish education, one still has a choice as to whether to comply or not—as Rabbi Akiva did, at the cost of his life. But this interpretation raises a fresh question: why would this teaching appear in Avot in the midst of other teachings from the same rabbi that appear to address humankind’s relationship with God and not with one another?

* For the benefit of members of Generation Alpha, I should explain: there was a time when emails did not yet exist and most personal correspondence was written by hand, on paper, using a pen. Stationers sold a choice of plain and lined writing paper, the latter for the benefit of purchasers like me who found it difficult to write straight across the width of the page. The same principle is used in the writing of gittin, Jewish religious divorces, where lines are scored on to the paper before the scribe writes the Hebrew text.

 

Thursday, 18 August 2022

Does God accept bribes?

Parashat Ekev features one of the most majestic statements of God’s role as the God of din, strict justice: At Devarim 10:17, Moshe tells his brethren: “For the Lord, your God, is the God of gods and the Lord of lords, the great God, mighty and awesome, who shows no partiality and accepts no bribes”.

This statement of God’s impartiality is paralleled by a Mishnah in which Rabbi Elazar HaKappar expands the catalogue of God’s judicial attributes: “He is the One who fashions, He is the Creator, He is the One who understands, He is the judge, He is the witness, He is the plaintiff—and He will judge. He is blessed since before Him there is no iniquity, no forgetfulness, no favouritism and no taking of bribes” (Avot 4:29).

The description of God as a deity who does not take bribes immediately attracts our attention. It is axiomatic that the world runs on three things—truth, justice and peace (Avot 1:18)—and that God is the ultimate source of true justice (Devarim 32:4). If it is unthinkable that God’s justice is founded on anything other than His appreciation of the truth, why should both the written and oral Torah take the trouble to tell us that He does not take bribes?

Rambam addresses this question in his Pirush Mishnayot.  Since it is quite unimaginable that anyone can buy God’s favour by giving Him money, this cannot be what the Mishnah teaches. Rather, Rambam opines, it advances the important practical consideration that a person cannot “buy” God’s goodwill through the performance of good deeds: even if a person performs a thousand good deeds and just one bad deed, God does not allow the performance of those good deeds to provide a mechanism for overlooking that one bad deed. Rather, He will make a point of both rewarding the thousand good deeds and holding the person who performs them accountable for even the one bad deed. Rambam cites two examples of God’s judicial impartiality: the punishment of the otherwise impeccable Moshe for angrily striking the rock instead of speaking to it and, to contrary effect, the rewarding of Eisav, despite his generally execrable conduct, on account of the exemplary way in which he honoured his parents.

One might imagine that there was nothing further to say on the subject, but this is not so. Sforno links this mishnah to that of Rabbi Elazar Ish Bartota (“Give Him from His own, for you and your possessions are His…”: Avot 3:8). Even by performing a mitzvah, ostensibly as a bribe, one is only rendering unto God that to which He is already entitled. Another example of fine-tuning of Rambam’s position comes from Rabbi Liepman Philip Prins. Concluding Rabbi Marcus Lehmann’s commentary on Avot, Rabbi Prins felt that Rambam’s commentary itself required elucidation: individual good deeds and bad deeds cannot cancel one another out because the footprints of their personal and communal impacts are not coextensive. God must therefore address each on its own terms. Maharal (Derech Chaim) employs a similar metaphor: quite simply, the mitzvah does not cover the sin.

Other commentators frame this Mishnah within an entirely different Torah context. Thus Rabbi Yaakov Chagis (Etz HaChaim) sees it as a counter to the text of the Birkat Kohanim (Bemidbar 6:26) which, taken at face value, suggests that God indulges in favouritism, as does the Talmudic proposition (Pesachim 8a) that a person whose son is ill might purchase the favour of God by giving a perutah to a poor man. These matters, explains the Rabbi, relate to God’s active involvement in this world—not to His judgment in the World to Come.

More surprising is the statement of Rabbi Yisrael Meir Lau (Yachel Yisrael) that “many commentators … disagree with Rambam, and state that the heavenly court can exchange sins for mitzvos, a position that is supported in many Rabbinic statements”. To support this proposition Rav Lau looks beyond the commentaries to considerably earlier sources: he cites a discussion at Sotah 21a to the effect that “a sin extinguishes a mitzvah”. With respect, neither this quote nor the passage in which it appears provide overt support the proposition that God takes bribes. Rav Lau does however point to a more persuasive source: a citation from Yalkut Shimoni Tehillim 670, where King David describes God as accepting bribes in the form of “repentance, good deeds, and prayer”. This midrash would however appear to be seeking to advocate the efficacy of repentance, good deeds and prayer rather than to be furnishing proof that God takes bribes.

Even if we do not speak in the emotive terminology of bribery and favouritism—two words that we should be reluctant to apply to God if we are uncomfortable at applying them to ourselves—the mere possibility of trading a good deed for a bad one raises issues that extend beyond the scope of this short piece. One is the status of the mitzvah haba’ah be’averah, an action that simultaneously encompasses the fulfilment of one command and disobedience to another.  There is also the status of the averah lishmo, where a transgressor pleads in mitigation his or her belief that the wrongful act has been committed, as it were, for God’s benefit. The relationship of God’s (non)acceptance of bribes to mitzvah haba’ah be’averah and to the averah lishmo are issues that are too large and complex to be developed here. If there is sufficient interest, I shall endeavour to tackle them in a separate post.

The Jewish position on bribing God invites comparison with early Christian practice relating to the grant of indulgences. This was a prominent feature of Catholicism until the Council of Trent began the process of bringing it under control in 1562. Although the purchase of indulgences by sinners was sometimes regarded as a means of paying for the privilege of committing a sin, it was technically no more than the purchase by the sinner of a reduction of the punishment incurred for the committing of a sin that had already been forgiven. Some indulgences involved the payment of cash, which may indeed have looked like a bribe, while others were granted in exchange for the sinner agreeing to make a pilgrimage, recite one or more prayers or perform such acts as the Church might specify. Initially granted at the request of martyrs awaiting execution and those who were unable to bear the full burden of penances imposed upon them, indulgences became an attractive source of income for the Church and were so frequently subject to abuse on both sides that they provided the centrepiece for Martin Luther’s blistering attack on the Church’s mismanagement in 1517.

To conclude, let us return to the verse from parashat Ekev which opens this piece and which clearly and unambiguously establishes that God is a just God, a fair and impartial judge who dispenses justice in a manner that lies way beyond mortal bribery. We can say that the mishnah of Rabbi Elazar HaKappar does not diminish this proposition. Together with the various commentaries on it, its teaching sensitises us to the need to recognise that God is not open to negotiation. Since we cannot trade off mitzvot for the sake of being allowed to escape punishment for the sins of our choice, it is for us serve Him in the manner that He requires; we should be content with the reward He sets aside for us in the next world in return for our own honest service.

  

Wednesday, 17 August 2022

Abarbanel in brief

The headline of this post, "Abarbanel in brief", may seem somewhat strange to anyone who knows him. This is because Rabbi Don Yitzchak Abarbanel is no miniaturist. Like his commentary on the Torah, his thoughts on Pirkei Avot, Nachalat Avot, are quite fascinating -- but they are also extremely long. The Abarbanel's preferred modus operandi is to front-load his discussion of each mishnah and baraita with a list of questions, often quite numerous, and then to address them. Nachalat Avot is not however just a pirush on Avot; it is also a window on to the world of government, monarchy and civic responsibility, reflecting Don Yitzchak's many and varied experiences as an influential court Jew.

The book I have before me, Be'Orcha Nireh Or, is a kitzur Nachalat Avot -- a shortened version of the massive original. Privately published and distributed free, it is dedicated to the memory of R' Baruch Neriah ben Zilpah veRachamim, who is also honoured by the reproduction of several pages of photographs and personal notices at the end of the volume.

With around 250 pages of large, clear Hebrew print, this kitzur is much shorter than the original (my Nachalat Avot runs to over 400 pages of Rashi font small print). Thus Don Yitzvhak's 26-side essay on Avot 4:29, in which R' Elazar HaKapar closes the perek with a warning about the impossibility of escaping the duty to give an account of oneself to God) is whittled down to half that length, 

Without running heads to tell you where you are when you open the book, this kitzur can be a little slow to navigate. Even so, it is an extremely handy means by which a person can dip into the Abarbanel's scholarship.

I picked up my copy at Pomeranz. If you don't live in Jerusalem but want a copy, there's a contact email: aterettifferet@walla.com.

Monday, 15 August 2022

Hedgehogs, Foxes and the "one great thing"

During the First Temple period, shortly after the wicked king Menashe ascended the throne, an obscure Greek poet living on the tiny island of Paros was busy composing his verses. His name was Archilochus and some fragments of his work have survived until today. One such fragment reads πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα ("a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog knows one big thing").

On one level this is a trite observation, drawn from nature. The fox, an opportunist omnivore who shares with the Jewish people a fondness for chicken, finds its food wherever it can. This task requires resourcefulness, cunning and the ability to learn from both successful and failed experiences. As its potential prey, the hedgehog need only know one crucial thing: how to roll into a prickly ball in order to ward off whatever stratagem the fox or any other predator might use.  

But there is a higher level too.  In The Hedgehog and the Fox, a celebrated essay published in 1953, the eminent philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin wrote of the contrasting characteristics of these animals. He then proceeded to categorise many well-known personalities as sharing the outlook of one or the other. Sir Isaiah and his followers classed Plato, Nietzsche, Marx, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Sir Winston Churchill as “hedgehogs”, while Aristotle, Shakespeare, Freud, Warren Buffett and Benjamin Franklin were “foxes”.

Should a practising Jew be regarded as a fox or a hedgehog? In parashat Ekev (Devarim 10:12-13) Moshe says:

“And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you? Only that you fear the Lord your God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul. To keep the commandments of the Lord, and His statutes, which I command you this day for your own good”.

There are 613 mitzvot in the Torah and a good many more beyond it, so a statement that one must obey them for love and fear of God would appear to reflect the policy of the hedgehog. An extreme version of the same reductionist position appears in the Talmud (Makkot 23b-24a) where we learn that King David was able to reduce this total of 613 to a mere 11. Not to be outdone, the prophets Isaiah, Micah (and Isaiah again) whittled down the number of principles of Jewish faith to 6, 3 and 2. Habakkuk (at 2:4) then founded the entire Torah on a single grundnorm: “But the righteous shall live by his faith”. This fragment of prophetic verse could very well have been a summary of the words of Moshe quoted above, since it is faith in God that generates every part of that great leader’s advice. Both offer us just one great rule to fit every situation—and that is very much the territory of the hedgehog.

But there is more. The considerations we have reviewed above all represent the Tanach, the fixed and immutable truths of the Written Torah. Is the Oral Torah for hedgehogs too?

A reading of the tractate of Avot as a whole suggests that the life of a morally responsible, ethically sensitive Jew requires the skills and the reflexes of the fox. Its dynamics reflect the tension of when to speak and when to remain silent, when to give respect and when to avoid it, when to act and when to stand aside, and so on. Three of its key mishnayot (Avot 2:1, 2:12 and 2:13) open with a Tanna asking which is the right path to choose (or avoid); they conclude with answers that tell us how to find those paths but not what they are in purely factual terms. The overriding principle in Avot is the exercise of discretion and personal initiative when ducking and weaving to escape the problems that block one’s passage through life.

Putting the Written and Oral Torah together, we can now see that we do not live in a binary world in which everyone is either a hedgehog or a fox. A Jew must be both. He or she must know when to emulate the hedgehog, batten down the hatches and take the path of security and caution, and when to take the path less travelled, or not yet travelled at all, sniffing out fresh sources of inspiration in prayer and learning, innovative solutions and creative devices for growing in one’s service to God.

Is any proof needed? Let us turn again to the animal kingdom. Since the dawn of creation the great knowledge of the hedgehog has been a brilliant and simple solution to the problem of fending off predators. However, it little avails the bold animal that, venturing beyond the hedgerow, aspires to fend off passing traffic as it crosses the road. Without innovation the hedgehog is just an endangered species, another victim of roadkill. In sharp contrast, the fox’s initiative and ability to learn on the job, as it were, have provided it with a host of new and exciting opportunities for urban living while its rural habitat diminishes. This is not merely survival: it is prosperity and growth.

To conclude: when we study the Torah and seek to implement its ways within our lifestyle, we seek to respect and observe the Torah’s eternal values and mitzvot while living in a world of constant change, change that lies beyond our power to control or prevent. In doing so, it appears that there is no alternative. We must be both hedgehogs and foxes.

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Historical postscript: Sir Isaiah Berlin was a direct descendant of Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the Ba’al HaTanya and author of the Shulchan Aruch HaRav. It would have been interesting to know whether he classed his illustrious ancestor as a hedgehog or a fox—or as both.

Friday, 12 August 2022

Harry Potter and the Tractate of Truth

Sometimes it is good to seek the counsel of others. This is one such occasion.

A few days ago I was asked if I might consider writing another book on Avot. Unlike the usual commentaries, this book would be an appreciation of Avot viewed through the medium of the seven Harry Potter novels. At present I am very much in two minds about taking this suggestion any further. My thoughts on the topic can be divided as follows:

In favour of the book

  • The seven Harry Potter books are probably the best-known novels in history. By 2019 their aggregated sales passed the 500 million mark and they have been translated into more than 80 languages. In discussing the morals and ethical positions taken by the characters, the writer can be assured of the familiarity of readers with its case studies and also be sure, at least initially, of a fairly high interest level.

  • Many of the main characters in the series are quite nuanced, leading the reader to form an opinion of them which must later be revised. Likewise, many of the episodes represent opportunities in which characters have either applied principles from Avot or have conspicuously failed to do so.

  • A considerable proportion of younger readers find traditional religious-interest story books hard to relate to, since they deal with kings, inn-keepers, wagon-drivers and tzaddikim who are not easily identified with figures in their own experience. Harry Potter however deals with schools and teachers, the problems faced in growing up and dealing with adults, and so on. 

  • The notion of discussing critically the conduct of fictional characters is by no means unprecedented and can be a powerful way of conveying a mussar message. A recent example is Into the Woods, a movie in which characters from children's nursery tales are dramatically called to account for their often wrongful or immoral actions.
Against the book

  • There is a risk that, irrespective of the quality and nature of the text, the book may create the impression of seeking to trivialise Avot and its many teachings.

  • The book might be judged as being no more than an attempt to cash in on the popularity of Harry Potter.

  • While many major issues and topics are reflected in the text of one or more of the seven-book series, there are some mishnayot and baraitot that have no obvious relevance to them.

  • The book might not so much attract readers to think more about Avot and internalise its message but instead drive them back to reading and re-reading Harry Potter and other works of juvenile fantasy.

  • Many parents are uncomfortable about their children reading books which lack any specifically Jewish content but which do discuss practices of witchcraft and wizardry that are plainly not encouraged by the Torah. 

  • On a personal note, when this proposal was put to me, I experienced an uncomfortably high level of pride at having been asked which left me wondering whether, if I were to write this book, I would be doing so with the right motives. 
There is already a haggadah with a Harry Potter theme -- Moshe Rosenberg's An (Unofficial) Hogwarts Haggadah -- which does not seem to have brought about the apocalypse. Children from the most strictly orthodox families will in the main not have seen it and they would probably know little or nothing of Harry Potter anyway. In contrast, children from the least religiously oriented backgrounds would almost certainly welcome it as a pleasant distraction from the traditions of what, for the young, often seems an interminable evening. But there are many children in the middle, who read Harry Potter books but are expected to buy into their Jewish heritage too. And while the Pesach seder is only only once or twice a year, Avot applies 24/7, all year round, so the potential impact of a Potter-oriented Avot book is greater, as is the responsibility of getting it right.

So, blog readers, do please let me know: should I take the path of prudent caution and avoid this project like the plague -- or should I go ahead and embrace it with all my usually infectious enthusiasm?

Thursday, 11 August 2022

Kids' stuff

Many books on Pirkei Avot are tough going for the reader. They are often packed with mussar, designed to stir the conscience and to point to our shortfall in our behavioural standards. Children's books are an exception; they are designed to appeal to the young and growing child, both aesthetically and in terms of the accessibility of their content.

Genendel Krohn's Ma'aseh Avos was published by Feldheim last year and I missed its emergence, being submerged in the writing of my own book. Krohn is a writer of popular works that are addressed to a readership of kids who belong to the committed orthodox camp. As one might expect, this introduction to Avot teaches without being preachy and it illustrates principles drawn from that tractate in ways that children can easily identify with.

The author wisely does not attempt to cover Avot in full. She has selected three mishnayot or baraitot from each of the six perakim, illustrating them with memorable stories that will resonate particularly strongly with readers who can identify themselves or the main protagonists. In keeping with the spirit of Avot 6:6, Krohn even cites the source of each of her illustrative tales. Brightly coloured artwork by Tirtsa Pelleg literally completes the picture of a fun first book on Avot.

Ma'aseh Avos is published by Feldheim; it can be purchased in all good Jewish bookshops (inevitably I found my copy in Pomeranz's Jerusalem store) and on Amazon.